Barrock Lecture: The Accidental Crime Commission: Its Legacies And Lessons by Zimring, Franklin E
Marquette Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 4 Symposium: Wickersham Commission Article 4
Barrock Lecture: The Accidental Crime
Commission: Its Legacies And Lessons
Franklin E. Zimring
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Franklin E. Zimring, Barrock Lecture: The Accidental Crime Commission: Its Legacies And Lessons, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 995 (2013).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss4/4
09 ZIMRING (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013 11:16 AM 
 
BARROCK LECTURE 
 
THE ACCIDENTAL CRIME COMMISSION: 
ITS LEGACIES AND LESSONS* 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING** 
I.  INTRODUCTION: A DIFFERENT COUNTRY ................................... 996 
II.  FUTILITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION .................................... 997 
III.  THE WICKERSHAM MODEL: FOUR ELEMENTS .......................... 1002 
A. Staff Dominance ...................................................................... 1003 
B. An Emphasis on Empirics ...................................................... 1004 
C. Taking the Long View ............................................................. 1005 
D. The Commission as Ceremony of Adjustment ...................... 1006 
IV.  THE COMMISSION THAT NEVER WAS ......................................... 1007 
V.  A DANGEROUS THOUGHT EXPERIMENT ................................... 1010 
 
Judged by its initial mission, and by its influence on the problems 
that inspired its creation, the Wickersham Commission (“Commission”) 
created in 1929 by President Herbert Hoover was an unmitigated 
failure.  The President had created the Commission as an apologist for, 
and in an attempt to reform, the federal law that created and 
administered the prohibition of alcohol in the United States in the years 
after 1919.  Remembered now as the very first national commission on 
crime, both its primacy and its focus are urban legends in substantial 
part.  It wasn’t the first national crime commission—that was appointed 
 
 * On October 4 and 5, 2012, Marquette Law School held a conference on the 
Wickersham Commission—so named after its chairman, George W. Wickersham, a former 
attorney general of the United States.  The occasion—the 80th anniversary of the conclusion 
of the Commission’s work—provided an opportunity to reflect on the federalization of law 
enforcement in the intervening decades.  The conference’s keynote address was the Law 
School’s annual George and Margaret Barrock Lecture on Criminal Law, delivered by 
Franklin E. Zimring, the William G. Simon Professor of Law and Wolfen Distinguished 
Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley.   
 ** Trevor Gardner provided extensive and valuable research help in this process.  
Lawrence Friedman, Samuel Walker, and Carl Zimring provided informed historical 
comments on an earlier draft.  Michael O’Hear proved to be a historically informed legal 
scholar with helpful commentary.  James Calder tutored me on historical sources for 
Wickersham budgets. 
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by President Calvin Coolidge in 1925.1  And it wasn’t really created as a 
national commission on crime.  The lion’s share of crime is the province 
of state and local government: state criminal codes and prisons, county 
courts and sheriffs, and municipal police.  But the primary focus of the 
Wickersham Commission was on Prohibition and on the observance of 
the Federal Volstead Act.2  This not only was a guarantee that 
Prohibition would remain the Commission’s central focus, but it also 
provided a potential diversion from much of the illegitimacy, corruption, 
and lawlessness of the local governance of crime in America. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: A DIFFERENT COUNTRY 
The United States of 1929 was a very different nation from 1969 or 
later, in ways that would have doomed any examination of crime and 
law enforcement short of a very radical critique.  For starters, the 
United States was dominated by legal systems that were overtly racist, 
ranging from Jim Crow horrors in the South to the more subtle but 
pervasive forms of race discrimination in housing, education, and 
miscegenation law through most of the North.  And lynching was still 
not an uncommon practice in much of the American South until the 
middle of the 1930s—one national count averaged seventeen cases per 
year in the decade between 1926 and 1935.3 
A national commission to study crime and justice thoroughly in this 
era would need the likes of W. E. B. Du Bois and Norman Thomas 
rather than the good Republican burghers and establishment lawyers 
that manned the Wickersham Commission.  And even a true blue-
ribbon commission on Prohibition would, by the early 1930s, have had 
to acknowledge that the “great experiment” was beyond any hope of 
redemption.  If Herbert Hoover had designed this enterprise as the 
launching pad for a new, improved version of the Volstead Act, the 
Commission’s task was hopeless from day one. 
And not just because Hoover had appointed the wrong commission 
or waited a bit too long.  The changes that had overtaken the 
Prohibition experiment in its short career were so profound that the 
 
1. See Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Crime Commissions, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 353, 353 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
2. The title of the Commission, National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, was an obvious euphemism for Prohibition. 
3. See Lynchings, By Year and Race, 1882–1968, THE CHARLES CHESNUTT DIGITAL 
ARCHIVE, available at http://www.chesnuttarchive.org/classroom/lynching_table_year.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
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nation that had created the push for Prohibition was not the same nation 
in which the experiment was conducted.  The temperance movement 
had its roots in an America of towns and rural areas, the United States 
of the turn of the twentieth century.4  Most of the nation’s population 
lived outside urban areas in 1900, and much of the population in rural 
areas and small towns feared and distrusted the big cities, which were 
expanding dramatically with industrialization, and the surge of 
immigration that greatly diversified the national landscape between 
1890 and 1920.  The 1920 census was the first time that the number of 
persons living in urban areas equaled the number living in rural areas. 
So the occasion for this conference in 2012 is a bit of a mystery.  
How did this hopeless venture end up being viewed as a precedent-
setting and positive contribution to the ways in which the national 
government learns about crime and criminal justice?  I will provide my 
take on this question in three installments.  Part II will describe how the 
Commission was structured and staffed and the broad ambitions of the 
Commission’s work on crime, police, and prosecution.  Part III will 
propose four important innovations in Wickersham that later 
commission efforts adopted.  And Part IV will consider governmental 
alternatives to blue-ribbon commissions and how they have functioned 
in recent history. 
II.  FUTILITY IS THE MOTHER OF INVENTION 
I suspect that the impossibility of the Commission’s original mandate 
may have helped to remake it into the enterprise we remember and 
honor.  Unlike the Coolidge Administration’s slapdash commission on 
crime in the mid-20s, the Wickersham effort had significant financial 
resources—the initial budget of $250,000 in 1930 dollars was quite 
substantial, and the final expenditure, close to $500,000, was the 
inflation-adjusted equivalent of just under $7 million in 2012.5  President 
Hoover and many of its members considered it an important 
 
4. See generally JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (2d ed. 1986). 
5. For Wickersham funding, see JAMES D. CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: HERBERT HOOVER’S INITIATIVES 84 (1993) (noting 
the initial budget), and Senate Yields on Wickersham Fund; Votes All, CHI. TRIB., July 4, 
1930, at 2 (indicating the final budget).  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) Inflation Calculator 
demonstrates that $1 in 1930 is worth $13.75 in 2012.  See CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
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undertaking.  The commitment of Hoover to science and empirical data 
probably motivated the resources that made Wickersham more than a 
gesture.  The resources and standing of this blue-ribbon institution 
became an opportunity for sustained analysis of issues and phenomena 
tangentially related to Prohibition  and the federal criminal justice 
system, issues such as crime and criminal justice in the broader 
American landscape. 
The substantial resources available to the Wickersham Commission 
provided the opportunity to avoid one of the central academic 
complaints that greeted the early Coolidge Commission, that the 
commission lacked “expert knowledge” and “special experience.”6  
What the Coolidge Commission lacked was a staff and therefore any 
substantive research.  With financial resources, the new Wickersham 
Commission could employ a staff and fund papers by expert consultants. 
And this the Wickersham Commission did with precedent-setting 
energy.  The vast majority of the consultant papers published by the 
Commission were not about Prohibition or its enforcement but about 
crime and criminal justice.  Both the methodology of Wickersham in 
generating expert reports and the volumes produced by the 
Commission’s experts are the enduring legacy of Wickersham.  
Depending on experts and deferring to expert judgment had profound 
impact not only on how commissions did their work but also on the 
substance of commission reports.  This was the key innovation of the 
commission, what I shall call the “Wickersham model.”  And this 
methodological legacy had a substantial impact on the many 
commissions that used methods close to the Wickersham model a 
generation later in the golden age of national commissions. 
With very few exceptions, the Wickersham Commissioners were not 
radical progressives, but the staff and consultants that produced 
Wickersham’s reports were emerging and established pantheons of 
social science (Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay7), social services 
(Miriam Van Waters8 and Edith Abbott9), and the legal academy 
 
6. John H. Wigmore, Editorial, The National Crime Commission: What Will It Achieve?, 
16 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 312, 312–13 (1925).   
7. See generally CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
AND URBAN AREAS: A STUDY OF RATES OF DELINQUENTS IN RELATION TO 
DIFFERENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES IN AMERICAN CITIES (1942); 
CLIFFORD R. SHAW & MAURICE E. MOORE, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF A DELINQUENT 
CAREER (1931). 
8. See ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, MATERNAL JUSTICE: MIRIAM VAN WATERS AND THE 
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(Zechariah Chafee10  and Sam Bass Warner11).  Only two of the eleven 
commissioners were academics (Roscoe Pound12 and Ada Comstock13), 
but the lion’s share of the staff reports that are the permanent record of 
the commission are the work of academics and reform-oriented lawyers. 
Figure 1: Median Age in 1929 of Commissioners Compared to Staff and 
Consultants, Wickersham Commission14 
One other important contrast between staff members and 
consultants on the one hand and commissioners on the other was 
demographic.  The median age of thirteen authors or coauthors of 
 
FEMALE REFORM TRADITION 57–58 (1996). 
9. See Mary Jo Deegan & Michael R. Hill, Edith Abbot, in WOMEN IN SOCIOLOGY: A 
BIO-BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SOURCEBOOK 29, 29–31 (Mary Jo Deegan ed., 1991). 
10. See DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND 
LAW 1 (1986). 
11. See, e.g., Sam Bass Warner, Creating a Plan for Criminal Court Statistics, 14 J. AM. 
JUDICATURE SOC’Y. 88, 88 (1930).  
12. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Future of Law, 47 YALE L. J. 1, 1 (1937).  
13. See, e.g., Susan Margot Smith, Ada Comstock Notestein: Educator, in WOMEN OF 
MINNESOTA: SELECTED BIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS 208, 214–16 (Barbara Stuhler & Gretchen 
Kreuter eds., rev. ed. 1998).  See generally ADA LOUISE COMSTOCK, THE EVOLUTION OF AN 
EDUCATOR: AN ANTHOLOGY OF PUBLISHED WRITINGS OF ADA LOUISE COMSTOCK 
(Barbara Miller Solomon ed., 1987).  
14. Trevor Gardner computed ages for all members of the Commission from published 
sources and for the following thirteen staff and consultants: McKay (28), C. Shaw (29), S. 
Simpson (31), R. Oppenheimer (31), C. Wilcox (31), B. Smith (37), M. Van Waters (41), 
W.H. Pollack (42), Z. Chaffee (44), H. Dennison (52), E. Abbott (52), A. Volmer (53), and H. 
Hart (78). 
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staff/consultant volumes was forty-one, and only four of the thirteen 
were over age forty-five in 1929 when the venture was launched.  By 
contrast, the median age in 1929 of the eleven members of the 
commission was fifty-eight, and only one member was under fifty when 
appointed. 
The generational difference between staff and members and the 
academic orientation of the experts writing reports made the emphasis 
on staff effort into a shift from an older, establishment, practitioner 
orientation (perhaps still reflected in brief commission reports) to the 
lengthy, empirical studies of the social scientists and the reform-oriented 
briefs of the policy-oriented lawyers. 
The two reports on Prohibition that were separately issued in 
January 1931 might have been an arresting example of the difference in 
tone between commissioners and staff experts.  The two reports 
combined extensive and powerfully written observations of the costs 
and ineffectiveness of Prohibition in the 1920s with a rather 
unenthusiastic endorsement of continued efforts to modify and improve 
Prohibition itself. 
Franklin P. Adams famously celebrated this mixed message in a 
brief poem, the only published poetic critique of national commission 
output that I have encountered: 
Prohibition is an awful flop. 
We like it. 
It can’t stop what it’s meant to stop. 
We like it. 
It’s left a trail of graft and slime. 
It don’t prohibit worth a dime. 
It’s filled our land with vice and crime. 
Nevertheless, we’re for it.15 
Part of the dissonance of these reports’ findings and their 
conclusions must be attributed to the need to respect Herbert Hoover’s 
 
15. Todd Shepherd, Michigan’s Wine Shipping Restrictions: A Valid Use of Twenty-First 
Amendment Control or Sleight of Hand Legislation Discriminating Against the Free Market?, 
88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 583, 589 n.65 (2011) (quoting Franklin P. Adams, The 
Wickersham Report, N.Y. WORLD (1931)).  Lawrence Friedman reported to me that the 
Franklin P. Adams ditty was adopted from an earlier ditty that begins: “Tobacco is a dirty 
weed/I like it,” often attributed to Graham Lee Hemminger in a college humor magazine.  
History, PHROTH, http://www.phroth.com/history/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2013) (noting that 
Hemminger wrote the poem in 1915 for the predecessor to Phroth, Froth, a Penn State humor 
magazine). 
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wishes.  But why then the hard-hitting analysis of costs?  Perhaps this 
came in part from the influence of staff on this documented history, 
since staff did most of the work and much of the writing.  And the 
documentation in the 1931 report was integrated into the arguments for 
repeal that were a major theme in the two years after it was issued.  The 
report is credited by later observers with aiding the cause of repeal. 
After the January 1931 release of the Prohibition materials, the next 
release of Wickersham reports came in late April (crime statistics), with 
the next eleven volumes being issued between June 7 and August 23, 
1931. 
Figure 2: Length of Reports and Extent of Press Coverage, 14 Wickersham 
Volumes (1931)16 
 
The figure below illustrates the uneven patterns of public attention 
to the work product of the commission.  The New York Times published 
a word count of all the commission’s publications in August of 1931,17 
which the figure below compares to level of news coverage provided by 
 
16. Word counts of reports, computed in The New York Times, August 24, 1931.  Id.  
Press coverage (words devoted to Prohibition reports in the week after publication, The New 
York Times) count by Trevor Gardner.  I do not include the one report the staff wrote and 
the Commission did not publish—a re-examination of a notorious 1916 case privately 
published in 1932.  See ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. ET AL., THE MOONEY-BILLINGS REPORT: 
SUPPRESSED BY THE WICKERSHAM COMMISSION (1932). 
17. Wickersham Slate Finally Is Cleared, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1931, at 2.  
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the Times in the week after reports were issued. 
While the Prohibition reports were less than 5% of the published 
product of the Commission and only two of its fourteen reports, they 
received the majority of immediate public attention.  The Prohibition 
reports accounted for more than three-quarters of the verbiage on 
Wickersham in the New York Times.  While none of the other reports 
generated more than a small fraction of the ink of the Prohibition 
materials, the distribution of attention to the rest of the reports did 
reflect the appetite for controversy and scandal.  The report on 
lawlessness in law enforcement got twice as much coverage as the next 
most-discussed non-Prohibition report (6,932 words versus 3,626 for the 
volume on prosecution).  The more important contrast is that 
“lawlessness” in law enforcement got more than ten times the attention 
that was accorded to the other report on police which was released 
earlier.  Even before electronic journalism, there was evidence of the 
adage, “if it bleeds, it leads.” 
What was to eventually commend this effort as a model of 
governmental research in crime and criminal justice was not what 
commanded public notice in the early 1930s. 
III.  THE WICKERSHAM MODEL: FOUR ELEMENTS 
The Wickersham Commission is not normally regarded as a major 
landmark in the march toward the repeal of Prohibition.  A recent 
history of the end of Prohibition, Last Call (2011), has only three 
references to the Commission’s work in its index and regards the reports 
as of minor influence.18  But Wickersham had more influence on the 
methods and functions of national commissions.  When I speak of the 
“legacies” of the Wickersham exercise, I am trying to identify four ways 
in which the structure and focus of this early commission of inquiry set 
precedents that can be observed in the cluster of national commissions 
that operated a generation later in the United States. 
I stop short of demonstrating that the similarity in structure was a 
clear case of cause and effect.  The four features of interest in this 
regard are (1) staff dominance, (2) an emphasis on empirical research, 
(3) a preference for long-range perspective instead of targeting a finite 
number of discrete policy proposals, and (4) an explanatory and 
retrospective orientation that often makes such reports into ceremonies 
 
18. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 320, 334, 351, 
467 (2010).  
09 ZIMRING (DO NOT DELETE) 6/23/2013  11:16 AM 
2013] THE ACCIDENTAL CRIME COMMISSION 1003 
of adjustment to changes that have already happened rather than 
proponents of change. 
A.  Staff Dominance 
The formal relationship between commissioners and staff in 
Wickersham and all other such bodies is hierarchical—the commission 
selects the staff and the staff works for the commission.  But, in fact, 
once the staff members have been selected by the commission, they tend 
to exercise considerable power over the work of a commission.  There 
are three features that maximize the impact of staff in Wickersham and 
every other American effort I know of—numbers, expertise, and 
authorship.  In a well-funded exercise like Wickersham, there are more 
staff than commissioners, and the staff may also devote more time to the 
enterprise than persons nominated to commission status because of the 
latter’s other prominent positions, which will often restrict their 
participation in commission efforts.  The two academics on the 
Wickersham Commission were both busy administrators—the dean of a 
law school and the president of a college.  The academics on staff were 
presumably less preoccupied with administrative duties. 
Then there is the matter of expertise.  The staff were selected for 
their expertise in specific areas—August Vollmer for law enforcement, 
Edith Abbott for immigrants and crime, Miriam Van Waters for young 
offenders, etc., so that their credentials created substantial influence. 
Finally, in American commissions, it is the staff who write most of 
the official prose.  All but one of the enormous subject-matter reports of 
Wickersham were authored by staff (the apparent exception being The 
Causes of Crime tome), and staff reports visibly dominate the output of 
the commissions on crime (1967)19 and on violence (1969).20 The author 
of a report generates what real estate agents call “sweat equity” for 
determining the substance of the report.  If you write the report, you 
have real influences on what it says. 
So the power of commissioners and senior staff is extremely 
important at the front end of the commission process—because they 
determine who will staff the process.  But once an expert staff has been 
 
19. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 311–12 (1967) [hereinafter 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE]. 
20. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, TO 
ESTABLISH JUSTICE, TO INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: FINAL REPORT, at xvi–xix (1969) 
[hereinafter U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE]. 
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selected, the balance of power shifts to the staff. 
The most prominent exception to that U.S. commission pattern of 
staff dominance is quite consistent with the influence of authorship on 
outcome.  During the era of government commissions on pornography, 
the British Home Office appointed a committee chaired by Professor 
Bernard Williams, a moral philosopher from Cambridge University.  
This low-budget committee was of exceptionally high intellectual 
quality, and Bernard Williams, the committee chair, wrote much of the 
report.21 
All of my short list of the causes of staff dominance were on display 
in the Wickersham experience and would become also the pattern of 
operation in the commissions of the 1960s and 1970s.  This may not be 
the result of later efforts explicitly modeling themselves on Wickersham 
so much as the natural result of the same processes that produced staff 
influence in 1930 doing so again in the U.S. commissions on crime, 
violence, and pornography.  Either way, the Wickersham Commission 
was a preview of coming attractions for the national commissions that 
followed. 
B.  An Emphasis on Empirics 
The Wickersham Commission produced fourteen volumes, a total of 
1.6 million words.  We have already seen that 95% of that verbiage 
didn’t directly concern Prohibition.22  But what types of perspective and 
ambition produced this verbal landslide?  To impose a verbal construct 
from the current era, what Wickersham became was the first “data-
driven” analysis of issues in crime and justice by a governmental 
commission in the United States.  And the staff dominance I just 
mentioned was an important cause of this emphasis on empirics in two 
senses.  The academics and reform-oriented lawyers who were on staff 
believed in empirical research, and they had the time and energy to 
gather the data and write the reports.  So the Commission was data-
driven because the staff were data-driven.  And this was a feature of 
most if not all of the policy commissions on crime and violence that 
were clustered in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
21. See GORDON HAWKINS & FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, PORNOGRAPHY IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 10–13 (1988). 
22. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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C.  Taking the Long View 
One other feature of the Wickersham endeavor that has been 
repeated in later efforts is an emphasis on long-range perspectives 
rather than specific, discrete policy choices.  On almost all the topics 
considered, the aim of the reports produced was to comprehend the 
phenomena and systems being considered rather than to focus on 
arguments for specific policy change (the possible exception here is 
criminal statistics).  The emphasis in Wickersham on perspective rather 
than a specific policy program was overdetermined.  President Hoover’s 
position on Prohibition certainly wasn’t broadly popular with either 
commissioners or staff.  And everything the staff reported on the 
problematics of enforcement in Prohibition pointed in the opposite 
direction from Hoover’s hopes.  Perspective was the only refuge in the 
extraordinarily complicated politics of Prohibition in 1931. 
And most of the other social science topics considered by 
Wickersham staff reports—crime and immigration, juvenile 
delinquency, the impact of disorganized city neighborhoods on crime 
rates—were efforts to create broad understanding rather than to 
mobilize legal change.  On the procedural side of the Commission’s 
agenda, for topics such as police corruption and the third degree, it was 
the level of government of this federal Commission rather than the lack 
of a policy agenda that restrained the Commission’s action agenda.  
There were no direct levers available to the national government in 
1931, such as federal financial aid or constitutionally based reversals of 
state criminal convictions as carrot or stick for state and local 
compliance with federal standards.  Shortly after Wickersham, one of its 
staff lawyers, Walter Pollak, argued the winning side of Powell v. 
Alabama (1932),23  the beginning of federal court controls on state 
criminal process. 
More striking than the orientation to perspective that Wickersham 
adopted is the fact that most of the later commissions also favored broad 
understanding and policy instead of centering attention on a specific 
reform.  The 1967 crime commission, generally regarded as the most 
successful of the genre, was organized around long-term development in 
areas such as police, crime statistics, juvenile justice, and organized 
crime.24  Both the civil disorder (Kerner) and violence (Eisenhower) 
 
23. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 47, 49–50, 73 (1932). 
24. See generally PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 19.  
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commissions argued for enormous changes in American society and 
government, but each was committed to change of such breadth that no 
specific law or session of a legislature could serve as a focus of activity.25 
At the other end of the spectrum, there were commissions on 
pornography and gambling that did not seem intent on arguing for any 
sharp changes in policy.26 
There have been, in other words, very large differences in the 
orientation of national commissions to social and legal change, yet an 
overarching similarity in the sense that no commission report in the 
modern era was centered on a finite list of specific changes as the core of 
an action agenda. 
D.  The Commission as Ceremony of Adjustment 
The central inconsistency identified in the Franklin P. Adams poem 
about Wickersham27  was the sustained documentation of the failures 
and social cost of Prohibition combined with the absence of any explicit 
recommendation by the Commission to repeal the Prohibition 
amendment and legislation.  But a more generous reading of 
Wickersham’s work on Prohibition is that its extensive documentation 
of cost and ineffectiveness provided a foundation for many supporters of 
Prohibition to accept the inevitable repeal of Prohibition two years later 
when it came.  In this sense, the Commission’s fact finding was much 
more important than its divided and convoluted policy 
recommendations.  Further, if this is an accurate reading of 
Wickersham’s historic function on Prohibition, then it was an important 
precedent for another common function of later national commissions—
what can be called the creation of a ceremony of acceptance and social 
adjustment to changes that are taking place. 
The most remarkable example of this “ceremony of adjustment” 
function relates to the commissions of inquiry on pornography that 
popped up all over the developed world after the late 1960s.  The 
United States had a national commission in the late 1960s that reported 
in 1970.28  Great Britain had one that reported in 1979.29  Canada had a 
 
25. See generally U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 
(1968); U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, supra note 
20. 
26. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & BERNARD E. HARCOURT, CRIMINAL LAW AND THE 
REGULATION OF VICE 473–513, 545–633 (2007). 
27. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.  
28. HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 21, at 7–10. 
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Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution in 1985,30 and 
Attorney General Edwin Meese commissioned a second report on 
pornography in the United States that reported in 1986.31 
And what did all these commissions recommend as legislative 
action?  Not much at all.  Because that wasn’t the primary social and 
political function of the inquiries.  Most of the commissions followed 
rather than preceded the widespread availability of pornography.  Only 
the 1970 Pornography Commission was issued prior to the theatrical 
release of Deep Throat in the United States (1972).32  The commissions 
were investigations of the effect of a new status quo that was emerging 
in most developed countries—all the social science was intended to 
reassure publics that Western civilization could survive Debbie Does 
Dallas.33  Even the Meese Commission, created to reassure conservative 
constituencies that pornography was harmful and objectionable, did not 
urge broad legal change but was, rather, an attempt to discredit the 
moral claims of liberals.34  And the National Commission on Gambling 
in the 1990s was similarly more concerned with regarding the growth of 
gambling as survivable than with advocating any path-breaking legal 
changes. 
In its own precedent-setting and peculiar fashion, perhaps the 
Wickersham Commission’s mixed teachings on Prohibition were an 
attempt to explain and justify the formal undoing of alcohol Prohibition 
that was by then looming on the American horizon. 
IV.  THE COMMISSION THAT NEVER WAS 
The cluster of national commissions that reported on problems of 
crime and violence in the 1960s and 1970s is now itself a generation or 
more removed from contemporary American government and public 
policy discourse.  There are, to be sure, a number of commissions of 
inquiry appointed by federal and state governments to consider 
particular subjects—and some of the topics come close to crime and 
violence.  But we had no national commission on school violence in the 
wake of Columbine to parallel the Eisenhower Commission on Violence 
 
29. Id. at 12. 
30. Id. at 25, 227.  
31. Id. at 13–16.  
32. DEEP THROAT (Gerard Darniano Film Productions 1972).   
33. DEBBIE DOES DALLAS (School Day Films 1978).  
34. HAWKINS & ZIMRING, supra note 21, at 13–15. 
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(1969)35 and the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorder (1968).36  (The 
commission to investigate the September 11 disaster is the exception 
that proves the rule on this: it was a body, like the Warren Commission, 
asked to confirm an official historical account and not consulted for 
policy.) 
It appears that what I would call a broad national commission 
approach to survey policy options in areas such as crime, drugs, 
violence, and race has passed from the American scene.  The last major 
attempt that I would put in this category was President Clinton’s 
“Initiative on Race.”37  And that isolated effort came two decades after 
any sustained use of commissions of inquiry about crime policy.  Why? 
There are two alternative explanations for the decline of the national 
policy commission.  One theory is the commission departed because it 
failed as a useful enterprise.  The other theory is that commissions came 
to be regarded as a threat to governmental policy orthodoxy.  The most 
important evidence that the day of the national commission had passed 
by the late 1980s concerns the drug emergency and the public moral 
panic over drugs during the decade after 1985.  That decade witnessed 
the ascendance of drugs to number one on a list of citizen-nominated 
“most serious problems” nationally, multiple layers of federal and state 
legislation, the creation of a national drug control agency with a drug 
czar, and annual editions of a glossy national drug control “strategy” to 
energize and reassure the population.38 
Indeed, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed almost everything a 
government is expected to do with novel and threatening problems 
except appointment of a high-level national commission on drug policy, 
and this trend was hardly an accident.  The annual report of the nation’s 
drug czar was designed as the opposite of a national or citizens’ 
commission; it was an official document under the control of the 
 
35. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, supra 
note 20. 
36. U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, supra note 25.  The 
Commission to represent the September 11 disaster is the exception that proves the rule on 
this.  It was a body like the Warren Report asked to confirm an official historical account and 
not consulted for policy.  See generally THE NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON 
THE UNITED STATES: THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004).  
37. See ADVISORY BOARD’S REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, ONE AMERICA IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY: FORGING A NEW FUTURE (1998). 
38. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL 
DRUG CONTROL (1992). 
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executive branch policy makers in the field.  It was, to borrow a phrase 
from a famous Argentine film, The Official Story.39  A presidential 
commission of any degree of independence was probably considered too 
great a risk to generate unwelcome conclusions.  In that same pattern as 
Marquette Law Professor Michael O’Hear has reminded me, the federal 
sentencing commission created in the 1980s keeps empirical evaluations 
of sentencing as “in house” efforts rather than tolerating external 
review. 
The absence of a real national commission on drugs did not escape 
public notice.  Walter Cronkite, near the end of a long and distinguished 
career in news reporting and analysis, concluded an hour-long special 
broadcast on drugs in 1995 with the following: 
It seems to this reporter that the time has come for President 
Clinton to do what President Hoover did when Prohibition was 
tearing the nation apart: appoint a bipartisan commission of 
distinguished citizens, . . . a blue-ribbon panel to reappraise our 
drug policy right down to its very core with a commission with 
full investigative authority and the prestige and power to 
override bureaucratic concerns and political considerations, . . . 
and present a comprehensive drug policy for the future.40 
Cronkite’s view of the Wickersham Commission was informed by 
nostalgic distortions of epic proportions.  After all, a majority of the 
commissioners had maintained their support of the Eighteenth 
Amendment. 
But more than nostalgia suggests that a Wickersham-style analysis of 
the War on Drugs in 1990 or 1995 (or ever) might have destabilized the 
major elements of drug Prohibition for at least an important segment of 
the public and would hasten rather than retard the pace of policy 
change.  And there is support in the history of Wickersham for this view.  
The pro forma support of Prohibition by most commissioners did not 
count for much in public or legislative opinion.  The powerful fact-
finding in the report on Prohibition probably had greater impact.  Much 
as the Franklin P. Adams poem quoted earlier may have been intended 
to make fun of the commission, the poem accurately portrayed a mixed 
 
39. THE OFFICIAL STORY (Historias Cinematograficas Cinemania 1985). 
40. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 14–15 (2d ed. 2012) (quoting 
The Cronkite Report—The Drug Dilemma: War or Peace? (Discovery Channel television 
broadcast June 1995)). 
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message that many on the commission staff and some commissioners 
wanted to make a part of the public record of the Prohibition 
experience.  Any such forceful cost accounting of the modern war on 
drugs would provide little comfort to the drug control authorities.  
Whatever its flaws, the candor and balance of Wickersham on 
Prohibition enforcement makes William Bennett’s first National Drug 
Control Strategy look like the front page of Soviet-era Pravda by 
comparison.41 
While the absence of a national commission on drugs in the late 
1980s makes it clear that the age of the presidential commission on crisis 
problems in crime had passed, what is less clear is whether the drug 
emergency of the mid-1980s played an important role in pushing 
commissions off the national agenda or whether the lack of a 1980s drug 
commission was merely a result of the fact that the age of “policy” 
commissions on crime had already come to an end. 
Either way, the drug warriors of the 1990s would have been right to 
fear the impact of a national commission.  No matter their biases and 
political sensitivities, the staff and the members of such commissions 
usually have a commitment to fact gathering and to the importance of 
their problem in the larger national landscape.  Perhaps we overdosed 
on national commissions in the era of Warren, Katzenbach, Kerner, and 
Eisenhower, or perhaps we tended to overstate the acuteness of the 
problems put before commission bodies and to call for too many 
resources and too much change to remedy these selected national 
problems.  But in a political system and public consciousness that find 
problems easy to ignore, sustained attention on important chronic 
problems will often serve the public good. 
V.  A DANGEROUS THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
One interesting test of the value and limits of commissions of inquiry 
as a public policy tool is a “thought experiment” along the lines 
suggested by Walter Cronkite.42  Imagine that President Clinton had 
appointed a national commission on drug control in 1997 (prudence 
suggests the year after rather than the year before a presidential 
 
41. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 1, at Chapter 1.  Michael O’Hear has reminded 
me of another place where a government agency has supplanted independent fact-finding 
with research and evaluation under the control of the agency it should evaluate: the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission.  Here, too, the monopoly of in-house research generates self-
promotion to a problematic degree. 
42. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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election).  What sorts of questions might such a body have asked?  What 
sorts of research might have emerged?  What types of policy changes 
might this commission have considered and recommended?  What 
short-range and longer-range policy changes might have occurred in its 
wake? 
Like many thought experiments, there is considerable room for 
different assumptions and presumed effects in the future that we are 
asked to imagine in my Cronkite commission experiment.  And it is easy 
to use a mythical national commission as a magical mechanism that will 
change public prejudices and overcome persistent political logjams.  
Walter Cronkite seemed to be hoping for some such magical 
transformation with his televised plea in 1995.43 
My own view of the impact of our imaginary drug commission is 
much less optimistic than Cronkite’s but still leaves ample room to see a 
National Commission on Drug Control as a public benefit well worth its 
modest costs.  It could settle some factual questions, resolve 
disagreements about costs and outcome of public programs, and clarify 
difficult choices.  It could outline the nature of the drug problems we 
had best learn to live with and perhaps identify other problems that are 
not inherently part of government’s ongoing involvement in drugs. 
It could do many of the modest but important things that the 
Wickersham staff and commissioners accomplished in 1931.  And that, 
in my judgment, would be a considerable improvement on the public 
relations puffery that executive government now manufactures.  The 
commission of inquiry model that Wickersham brought to American 
crime and criminal justice probably served the public interest far better 
than some of its recent alternatives.  If so, this conference is well-timed 
for serious students of the American future. 
 
 
43. Id.  
